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one a masterful job of deflating notables of the stuffed shirt variety.

Satire is his forte and his peppering guns raked the political and business communities with a devastating fire power that never strayed from the bounds of good taste.

His targets remain his warmest friends.

Friebolin's native skill as a fashioner of witty lines has overshadowed his reputation as one of the nation's nimblest legal minds.

Early in his 51-year career as a referee, he became a national authority on bankruptcy law and taught a course on the subject at Western Reserve University.

As he prepares to close out this brilliant career, we salute him as a faithful and remarkable servant of his government and as a valued personality whose observations, we hope, will continue to titillate the community for many years to come.

file
Another Round for Otepka

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. JAMES A. MCCLURE

OF IDAHO

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, June 21, 1967

Mr. MCCLURE. Mr. Speaker, Otto Otepka is finally getting a hearing on the charges leveled against him by the State Department. Because of the continuing interest in this matter by many Members of Congress, I call to my colleagues' attention an excellent analysis of the Otepka case by the Richmond News Leader of June 8.

The editorial follows:

ANOTHER ROUND FOR OTEPKA

After 43 months, Mr. Otto Otepka got his chance Tuesday to defend himself against charges of "conduct unbecoming a State Department officer." But with a catch: His hearing before a department panel is being conducted in secret.

Otepka was fired Nov. 5, 1963, from his post as chief of the evaluations division of the department's office of security. Shortly thereafter, he was rehired and given a job clipping the *Congressional Record* in a Foggy Bottom cubicle at \$20,435 a year, pending the outcome of the current hearing. Readers may recall the events leading up to his dismissal:

Otepka insisted that full security proceedings should be followed in appraising the cases of such prize State Department errors as Alger Hiss, William Wicland and John Stewart Service. Back in 1961, for example, he had the names of some 800 department employees who had derogatory information in their files because of Communist or sexual involvements. He was so conscientious and impartial in his work, refusing to bend personnel records around the rules, that he got in the way of some State Department biggies.

As a result, his superiors bugged his phone, ransacked his files and fine-toothed his "burn bag" of classified trash. Concerned about the carryings-on of certain persons in the department, Otepka went to the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee. He named names and gave pertinent data. Otepka was entitled to do this, for the United States Code reads: "The right of persons employed in the civil service . . . to petition Congress . . . or to furnish information to either House of Congress or to any committee or member thereof, shall not be denied or interfered with." But Otepka got the pink slip.

Subsequently, three of his superiors were dismissed when they were caught lying in the

case, but have been transferred to other high-paying government posts. Otepka, who puts truth and loyalty to his country before his loyalty to the State Department, hired a lawyer and kept demanding the right to be heard. Now that he has his chance, the department has ruled that secrecy must cloak the current proceedings for "protection of the employee" and because classified documents will be introduced during the testimony. In this case, Otepka doesn't want to be "protected," and all the documents have been made public by the Senate subcommittee.

The State Department's vendetta against Otepka constitutes a challenge by the executive branch to every committee of Congress that seeks information from public servants employed by the taxpayers. If the department panel upholds Otepka's discharge, Otepka says he will appeal to the Civil Service Commission and then, if necessary, to the Federal courts. Only there, in the courts, would he get a chance to air publicly how far the State Department has gone toward wrapping itself in immunity.

file
Vietnam and the Middle East

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. JOHN A. BLATNIK

OF MINNESOTA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, June 21, 1967

Mr. BLATNIK. Mr. Speaker, seldom have writers so brilliantly analyzed the two current crises of Vietnam and the Middle East in the manner in which writer Emmet John Hughes clearly does in the following article. All of us have read and heard much about both subjects but few have reduced the vast amount of information on both to such a concise, intelligent comparison.

I can think of few instances in which so broad and detailed a subject matter has been boiled down to such a ready and readable summary. I commend his comparison of the two struggles to everyone's attention:

A MUDDLED TALE OF TWO WARS

The flash of Israel's lightning victory in the Middle East did more than lay brutally bare the incapacity of Arab generals to grasp the nature of modern war. The same bolt of light lasted long enough to make dismayingly clear the inability of many American leaders to grasp the nature of modern politics. For as passionate debate began to bracket the fates of Israel and Vietnam, the babel tended to betray, on many sides, narrowness of perspective and confusion of principles.

The liberal critics of the Johnson Administration—whether appalled by Israel's peril or exhilarated by its triumph—got themselves snarled in various troubles. On the eve of war, the gifted historian, Barbara Tuchman, sounded like the most steely GOP critic of the U.N. as she assailed its "futile fiddling" and ridiculed the Security Council as "a cynical farce." But within a mere fortnight, only the Arabs were picking up that bitter lament. And in the wake of war, the usually reflective editors of *The New Republic* attained a state of exaltation that impelled them to hail Israeli victory for having "changed the world balance of power more decisively than anything . . . since World War II," as they astonishingly reported "the ruin of Soviet prestige in the Middle East and everywhere else."

Yet all such quirks of judgment paled beside the attempt of Washington to confound all critics of its Vietnam war by equating it with the struggle of Israel. The Administration apologists argued that any citizen calling for U.S. action to support a political commitment in the Middle East had to recognize the same obligation as binding in the Far East. But the historic natures of the two conflicts bear as much similarity, of course, as sand and jungle. And since the analogy reflects such blurred official thought, its most obvious errors need noting . . .

1. The State of Israel is a unique phenomenon—equally by the terms of ancient history and modern history. It has been born of massive human tragedy defying all comparison. Its land populated and its life guarded by men from 100 nations, it stands as a triumph of moral unity and political creativity. By such reckoning, no modern state in the world may offer such stunning contrast to the wracked and primitive political life of South Vietnam.

2. The root natures of the U.S. commitments in the two arenas sharply differ. The bond to Israel is essentially moral. By any criterion of strict self-interest, the overriding U.S. concern would be for the Arab lands where U.S. oil companies have invested \$1.5 billion. By contrast, the commitment to the struggle in Vietnam has been overwhelmingly a calculation of self-interest: the containment of Chinese power.

3. Far from being commitments of matching weight and logical affinity, the two involvements could be at deadly odds. It has always been a reasoned fear of critics that the war in Vietnam could drain the U.S. of power to act in another arena. And the validity of this fear may be judged by a grim imagining of the events of the last fortnight—if the Soviets had been far more militant and the Israelis far less.

4. There are vast quantitative distinctions between the two wars, both militarily and economically. The total Israeli casualties in routing all Arab armies barely totaled 3,000—almost exactly the losses suffered by U.S. forces in Vietnam in a single week. Over the years, Israel has received help from abroad generally considered quite huge; some \$2 billion from worldwide Jewry and some \$1.6 billion in U.S. aid. These sums cover all the years since World War II. They are matched by what the U.S. spends in Vietnam each month.

5. The two lands differ utterly in terms of simple sovereignty—its exercise and its defense. In the Middle East, Israel has proved its sovereignty, within and beyond its borders. In Vietnam, the U.S. is struggling to build true sovereignty where none has ever existed. With dazzling irony, one powerful journalistic apologist for U.S. policy in Vietnam has reported a "first lesson" of the Arab debacle thus: "No amount of foreign hardware can make a military victor of a nation that lacks effective leadership and the will to win." Such a depiction of Russian failure in Egypt reads like a precise warning to American fantasy in Vietnam.

6. There could scarcely be clearer difference between the regions in which Israel and Vietnam must live their futures. It is an axiom of U.S. policy that peace in the Middle East demands reconciliation between the 2.5 million Jews and the surrounding mass of 50 million Arabs. But the American dream for Vietnam approaches the dramatic opposite: a kind of little Israel with its capital in Saigon, a people of some 16 million, stoically rebuffing the 800 Chinese millions on its borders.

These confusions of thought are not academic abstractions. A government that thinks in a disorderly way can only likewise act. And if two such arenas of historic danger stay muddled in its mind, it can perform with wisdom in neither.